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Abstract 
 
 
The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Data 
for a sample of UK companies over the period 2003-2006 are analyzed using a variety 
of econometric methods. We find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when 
firms employ more than one compensation consultant. Further, an increase in the 
number of compensation consultants is associated with an increase in CEO pay, 
whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay 
consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation consultant are 
positively related to CEO compensation. The finding is consistent with the conjecture 
that compensation consultants act to survive competition from other consultants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of compensation consultants in the executive pay setting process has 
become a widespread practice in the corporate world. Pay consultants are frequently 
hired by a firm’s compensation/remuneration committee which is responsible for the 
design of Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) pay package, but does not have adequate 
skill and knowledge about it.1 Due to a lack of adequate disclosure, the empirical 
evidence has so far been scarce on how the practice of employing compensation 
consultants influences executive pay. 
 
Recently, several studies demonstrate that CEOs of firms that employ compensation 
consultants receive higher pay relative to those who do not employ any consultant 
(Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist, 2010; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2009; Armstrong, 
Ittner and Larcker, 2008; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos and Walker, 2008). One notable 
phenomenon in this regard is that many firms seek recommendations from not just one 
but several compensation consultants. Analyzing a sample of 1046 US firms, Murphy 
and Sandino (2010) find that 181 firms (17%) use two or more compensation 
consultants. Conyon et al. (2009) report that while most US firms use only one 
compensation consultant, UK firms often use more than one pay consultant. The 
interesting question that has remained unanswered is whether CEO compensation 
increases or decreases when a firm employs more than one compensation consultant. 
The first purpose of our study is to conduct an empirical investigation of this issue. 
 
                                               
1 See, for example, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) and Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009) for a discussion on 
the functioning and quality of compensation committees. 
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Although there is no requirement for firms to disclose the costs of employing 
compensation consultants, anecdotal evidence suggests that these consultants do not 
come cheap (they charge about £500 - £800 an hour for their services).2 Murphy and 
Sandino (2010) observe that the average pay consulting fee paid in 2006 for a sample of 
Canadian companies was almost US$ 90,000. If a consultant does not come cheap, then 
it poses the question: why firms use these costly multiple compensation consultants? 
The usual assumption is that compensation consultants provide independent 
recommendations and a variety of pay related proprietary information. Using the 
‘efficient contracting’ view of executive pay, Armstrong et al. (2008) and Conyon et al. 
(2009) argue that consultants can help remuneration committees to design an 
appropriate level and structure of CEO compensation and thus align the interests of 
CEOs with those of shareholders. Bender (2008) suggests that if different compensation 
consultants specialize in different aspects of pay, firms can benefit from employing 
multiple consultants. 
 
On the other hand, Cadman et al. (2010) and Murphy and Sandino (2010) report that 
compensation consultants face severe conflicts of interests because they provide client 
firms additional types of lucrative advisory services (for example, employee 
benefits/pensions and actuarial services). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that 
compensation consultants have therefore strong incentives not to displease incumbent 
CEOs who otherwise would opt to hire a new consultant. Consequently, pay consultants 
would recommend higher CEO pay rather than risk losing their business to other 
competitors. Among firms employing one compensation consultant, there is an inherent 
competition from other consultants to attract new business opportunities whereas among 
                                               
2 For example, see, ‘Get me an above-average pay consultant’, The Mail on Sunday (February 6, 2005), 
and ‘Pay consultants are next in line for a pummelling’, The Sunday Times (March 8, 2009). 
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firms with multiple consultants, the contest is also towards retaining the existing 
business. This feature leads us to the second purpose of the study: to investigate if 
compensation consultants act in order to survive competition from other consultants. 
 
We undertake a detailed empirical analysis of compensation consultants by examining a 
sample of UK firms for the years 2003-2006. The study is of particular interest because 
each and every firm in our sample uses at least one compensation consultant and more 
than half of these firms employ multiple consultants. But, we know relatively little 
about whether shareholders of firms derive additional benefit from employing two or 
more pay consultants. Although prior studies (e.g. Cadman et al., 2010; Conyon et al., 
2009; Voulgaris et al. 2008) examine whether firms with compensation consultants in 
general pay their CEOs more relative to those who do not employ any pay consultant, 
we are not aware of any study that specifically investigates the issue of multiple 
compensation consultants. 
 
Another distinct feature of the study is that whilst concurrent studies examine 
compensation consultant data for one year only, ours analyze data covering several 
consecutive years. In contrast to US firms which had to disclose consultant related 
information with effect from December 2006, UK firms started providing this 
information several years earlier. The use of panel data taking into account both time-
series and cross-sectional variability thus allows us to undertake a more comprehensive 
and statistically reliable empirical analysis. An additional novelty is that we study how 
CEO compensation changes when firms decide to increase or reduce the number of pay 
consultants from one year to another. 
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We present two new findings to the extant literature. First, we observe that CEO equity-
based pay increases when firms rely on a higher number of compensation consultants. 
The finding holds after controlling for different firm, corporate governance and CEO 
characteristics. In particular, we find that an increase in the number of compensation 
consultants is associated with an increase in CEO compensation. But, there is no 
corresponding decline in CEO compensation when firms reduce the number of pay 
consultants. Second, we document that competition among compensation consultants 
leads to an increase in CEO pay. Specifically, we find that the market share of 
compensation consultants is significantly positively related to client firm’s CEO pay. 
The finding supports the conjecture that by advising towards higher pay, compensation 
consultants try to secure their business interests with the client firm and thereby survive 
from competition. All our empirical results are robust to a variety of econometric 
analyses that controls for different firm-specific, CEO-specific and corporate 
governance factors. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the two research 
questions of the study. Section 3 describes the research method. A description of data is 
presented in Section 4 while the empirical results of the study are presented in Section 
5. Finally, Section 6 presents summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Research questions 
 
The practice of employing executive compensation consultants has come under 
academic scrutiny only recently. The role of compensation consultants can be analyzed 
using two theoretical perspectives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2008). 
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According to the efficient or optimal contracting view, compensation consultants 
provide expert advice and useful information that help the Board of Directors to design 
an optimal structure of executive compensation so that greater manager-shareholder 
interest alignment can take place. In this context, the compensation consultant is 
deemed to act in the best interest of shareholders. On the other hand, according to the 
rent extraction or managerial power view, compensation consultants have strong 
incentives to help CEOs in receiving higher pay because it ensures continuity of their 
business relationships with client firms. In turn, CEOs can use their power to select and 
appoint those consultants who looked after their personal welfare. 
 
Wade, Porac and Pollock (1997) argue that a firm’s compensation committee usually 
validates high levels of executive compensation by citing a compensation consultant as 
advisor in the pay-setting process. Managerial rent extraction is further facilitated by 
employing multiple compensation consultants as firms try to justify higher CEO pay. 
Firms create an impression to the outside world that the decision on CEO compensation 
has been made by seeking advice from different consultants. Crystal (1991) observes 
that whenever a CEO is paid above the average, the company and consultants try to 
provide a justification of it. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that remuneration 
committees favor seeking advice from several compensation consultants in order to find 
the highest rate of pay for CEOs.3 However, this issue has not yet been examined in the 
academic literature. Therefore, the first research question we investigate is whether 
CEOs receive higher compensation when firms employ multiple pay consultants. 
 
                                               
3 The Sunday Telegraph (Jan. 4, 2004): ‘UK companies splurge on pay consultants’.  
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Our second research question relates to the compensation consultants’ pursuit for 
market shares and its relation with client firm’s CEO pay. Numerous compensation 
consultants are competing for both compensation and non-compensation related 
businesses. Recent studies (Cadman et al., 2010 and Murphy and Sandino, 2010) 
document that compensation consultants aim to secure additional (non-compensation 
related) businesses with the client firm. These businesses include providing consultancy 
on human resource management, internal control, insurance, financial and risk 
management. Apart from seeking additional businesses, compensation consultants also 
want to ensure the continuity of pay consulting business with the existing client firm. 
 
It is therefore almost impossible for compensation consultants to advise openly and 
critically on CEO pay. Crystal (1991) argues that if a consultant’s recommendation does 
not cause the CEO to earn more money, the consultant risks losing business with the 
client firm. Similarly, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that a recommendation from 
compensation consultant that displeases a CEO may risk the consultant’s future 
relationships with the firm. The prospect of lucrative business interests incentivize 
compensation consultants to compete intensely with each other.4 To ensure continuity in 
business, the incumbent consultant needs to recommend CEO pay to a level higher than 
that could possibly be recommended by other competing consultants. We would 
therefore observe that, ex post, higher CEO compensation would be associated with 
consultants having larger market shares. 
 
                                               
4 Although Bebchuk and Fried (2003) do not explicitly mention competition among compensation 
consultants, the prediction that the incumbent consultant might lose business to other consultants 
implicitly refers to the presence of competition. 
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3. Research methods 
 
To address the first research question, we initially perform a bivariate analysis to 
examine the simple relationship between compensation consultants and CEO 
compensation. Firms are classified according to the total number of compensation 
consultants used. For each category of firms, we then examine the level of CEO 
compensation. This descriptive analysis provides a preliminary evidence of whether 
CEO compensation increases when the number of compensation consultants employed 
by a firm increases. 
 
Then we proceed to a multivariate analysis that controls for a variety of firm-specific, 
CEO-specific and corporate governance determinants of pay (Conyon et al., 2009; 
Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Cadman et al., 2010). We first employ the pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression technique to investigate if the use of multiple 
compensation consultants is associated with higher CEO pay. The estimated model is 
written as follows: 
 
 
jttj
n
jtnjt
jt
ControlsCon
Pay
edlbba +++++= å
2
1
    (1) 
 
The dependent variable Payjt refers to compensation received by the CEO of company j 
at time t. It is defined in several ways. One is the total annual compensation which is 
made up of the following components: salary, bonus, benefit5, pension increment, and 
                                               
5 This refers mainly to benefits such as car allowance and insurance premium paid on behalf of CEOs. 
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values of stock grants and stock option grants. The pension increment is derived from 
the difference between the actuarial values of defined benefit pension from two 
consecutive years. Stock grant is measured at the value of the equity discounted at 20% 
to reflect its performance-contingent character. The Black-Scholes-Merton value of 
stock option is employed to approximate the value of stock options. The other ways of 
defining Pay are by considering the amount and proportion of equity-based 
compensation (the value of stock grants and stock option grants) as well as variable 
compensation (sum of bonus, shares and stock option grants, and pension increment).6 
The explanatory variable Conjt is the total number of compensation consultants used by 
firm j at time t. As a robustness check, we also use another approach whereby a dummy 
variable is constructed that equals one if a firm uses two (three) or more consultants, 
zero otherwise. 
 
We use a variety of control variables that are commonly found in the literature to be the 
key determinants of executive compensation. These include firm characteristics (firm 
performance, firm size), CEO characteristics (age, tenure) and corporate governance 
characteristics (institutional ownership, CEO duality, board size, non-executive 
directors, remuneration committee size). All these variables are defined in the 
Appendix. For ease of comparison with prior studies, we use annual stock return as the 
measure of firm performance (Brick et al., 2006).7 The regression analysis also includes 
additional controls for industry ( jl ) and year ( td ). The remaining term in specification 
(1), εjt, is an idiosyncratic error term. 
 
                                               
6 The results from variable pay are similar to those of total pay. Therefore, these results are not reported in 
the paper but are available from the authors upon request. 
7 We also use another performance variable, return on assets, as part of robustness check. It is calculated 
as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
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We perform panel data regressions to supplement the analysis of pooled OLS 
regressions. The Hausman test shows that random effects model is more appropriate for 
the data we use than fixed effects model. Therefore, the results of random effects 
estimations are presented together with the OLS results. 
 
Our second research question is concerned with the association between compensation 
consultant’s market share and CEO pay. The estimated regression model is written as 
follows: 
jttj
n
jtnjt
jt
ControlseMarketShar
Pay
edlbba +++++= å
2
1
  (2) 
 
As before, the variable Payjt refers to the compensation received by the CEO of firm j at 
time t. The explanatory variable MarketSharejt represents the market share of a 
compensation consultant. The correct procedure to compute market share is to relate 
one firm with one consultant. This is because when firms use multiple consultants, it is 
not obvious which consultant has the greatest influence in determining CEO 
compensation. Therefore, we perform the analysis using those firms that employ only 
one compensation consultant. Market share is estimated as the number of client firms 
served divided by the total number of compensation consulting contracts in the market.8 
To assess the robustness of empirical results, we also identify the two leading 
compensation consultants (on the basis of market share greater than 10%) in the UK and 
estimate their isolated effects on CEO compensation. Similar to previous regression 
                                               
8 A better proxy to estimate market share could be to use the amount of fees received from the 
compensation consulting business. Unfortunately, this type of proprietary information is not publicly 
available in the UK. Instead, we assume that the fee is proportional to client firm’s sales and create an 
alternate, albeit less precise, proxy variable by multiplying the initially estimated market share by sales. 
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analysis, specification (2) also includes various firm, CEO and corporate governance 
characteristics as control variables. 
 
4. Data 
 
With the introduction of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002, UK 
listed firms are required to disclose the name of entity that provides advice or service in 
the executive pay setting process. This information is hand-collected from company 
annual reports. The sample is made up of non-financial UK FTSE 350 firms covering 
the period 2003-2006. We find that all but six companies with the available data employ 
at least one compensation consultant during these years. Due to non-availability of 
annual reports, mergers and acquisitions, etc., the final sample comprises 175 
companies. The criteria to select the final sample are summarized in Table 1 (Panel A). 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
The industry distribution of sample firms is shown in Table 1 (Panel B). Firms are 
classified into a number of industries according to the Primary Standard Industrial 
Classification Code obtained from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. 
Overall, the sample firms are spread over several industrial sectors. The largest number 
of companies (68 firms) belongs to the manufacturing sector, followed by transportation 
& communication sector (20 firms) and wholesale & retail trade sector (19 firms). 
 
Detailed CEO compensation data are also hand-collected from the director remuneration 
report section of firms’ annual reports. This hugely laborious process involves 
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collection of information on almost all disclosed components of CEO compensation: 
salary, bonus, stock grants, option grants, pension and other benefits. The very detailed 
coverage of CEO compensation information over several years makes our study one of 
the most comprehensive studies on executive compensation. Data on CEO 
characteristics and governance variables are also hand-collected from annual reports, 
while those on firm characteristics are collected from the database Datastream. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2. Firm level statistics 
are presented in Panel A while those on compensation consultants are presented in 
Panel B. There are 700 observations related to 175 companies covering the four-year 
period 2003-2006. The mean (median) CEO annual compensation is £1.94 million 
(£1.40 million). The average equity-based compensation (stock and option grants) is 
about £0.73 million, representing about 38% of total pay. When cash bonus and 
pensions are added with equity-based pay, the average CEO variable compensation 
increases to £1.36 million. This is about 70% of total compensation. 
 
The average stock return for sample firms is 14% (median is 17%). Sales, which is a 
measure of firm size, have an average (median) of £4.4 billion (£1.3 billion). Firm risk 
is measured by the volatility of monthly stock returns. We find that the average 
volatility of stock returns during the four years is equal to 33% (median 32%). Each 
firm in the sample employs at least one compensation consultant. We observe that, on 
average, there are two compensation consultants per firm. One firm used up to eight 
compensation consultants. Examining the board of directors, we find that the average 
firm has 10 board members. The median firm has equal number of executives and non-
executives. The Board of the retail company Morrisons had no non-executive member 
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in 2003. Every company has a remuneration committee and it has, on average, four 
members.9 The average CEO is 53 years old and has worked as CEO in the company for 
six years. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
The frequency distribution of pay consultants used by sample firms is presented in 
Panel B. We observe that 311 (44.4%) firm-years have one compensation consultant 
while the rest 389 (55.6%) use multiple compensation consultants. Of those firms 
employing more than one pay consultant, we find that 29.0%, 16.1%, 7.6% and 2.9% of 
firms use two, three, four and more than four consultants, respectively. Our findings are 
similar to Conyon et al. (2009) who find that 28% of their sample firms use two 
compensation consultants and 16% use three or more consultants. Voulgaris et al. 
(2008) also find that one-third of FTSE 100 and one-quarter of FTSE 250 firms employ 
multiple compensation consultants. The use of multiple consultants has become a 
common practice in the UK. In a comparative analysis, Conyon et al. (2009) observe 
that most US firms use only one pay consultant. 
 
We count the total number of compensation consultants used in the UK and find that the 
sample firms have 83 different compensation consultants. A similar pattern is 
documented by Murphy and Sandino (2010) who find 72 different consulting firms in 
the USA. While most firms use the same number of pay consultants each year, some 
firms also change their consultants from one year to another. We observe that an 
                                               
9 The remuneration committee of Morrisons consists of three executive members. Diageo had eight remco 
members in 2004 and 2006. 
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increase in the number of consultants takes place in 93 firm-years, whereas a decline 
occurs in 82 cases. 
 
Although a large number of compensation consultants provide services to client firms, 
the market is quite concentrated as only a few consultants dominate the industry. Panel 
B of Table 2 shows the six leading executive compensation consultants used in the UK. 
These are the consultants with more than five per cent market share. The most 
frequently used consultant is the New Bridge Street. It captures about 17.9% of the total 
pay consulting contracts, followed closely by its rival consultant, Towers Perrin 
(15.1%). The rest are Mercer (7.6% each), Monks (6.9%), Watson Wyatt (6.4%) and 
Deloitte (6.4%).10 These six leading consultant firms take up about 60.3% of the total 
compensation consulting businesses in the UK. With the exception of Deloitte, similar 
big five consultants are identified in the UK by Conyon et al. (2009). According to 
Murphy and Sandino (2010), the big six consultants in the US include Towers Perrin, 
Mercer, Watson Wyatt and Deloitte, and capture more than two-thirds of the total pay 
consulting contracts offered in 2006. Cadman et al. (2010) also document a similar 
picture. The dominance of a few consulting firms is an indication of the fact that 
competition in the sector is quite intense. The Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of 
the market shares squared, is 0.073. It confirms a high degree of competition facing the 
pay consulting business. 
 
                                               
10 New Bridge Street joined with Hewitt in 2008 to form Hewitt New Bridge Street whereas Towers 
Perrin merged with Watson Wyatt in 2009 to form Towers Watson. 
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5. Empirical results 
 
In analyzing the relationship between multiple compensation consultants and CEO 
compensation, we first perform a simple bivariate analysis. The sample firms are 
categorized according to the number of compensation consultants used and then the 
average (median) pay is calculated for each category. The results are presented in Table 
3 (Panel A).  
 
For firms employing only one compensation consultant, the average CEO total 
compensation is £1.658 million (median = £1.239 million). When firms with two 
consultants are considered, we observe an increase, albeit statistically insignificant, in 
total pay (mean = £1.779 million, median = $1.391 million). The positive trend in CEO 
compensation with an increase in the number of pay consultants continues further. The 
median CEO total compensation increases to £1.583 million when firms use three 
consultants instead of two consultants. The change is statistically significant (z-statistic 
= 2.19). In case of firms using more than four consultants, the mean total pay 
significantly increases to £4.071 million (t-statistic = 1.80) whereas the median CEO 
compensation significantly increases to £3.615 million (z-statistic = 2.04). A similar 
trend is observed when we analyze the various components of total compensation 
(salary, equity-based and variable pay) separately. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
In Panel B, we look at the year-to-year change in compensation consultants and the 
associated change in CEO compensation. For 350 firm-years, there is no increase or 
 15 
decrease in the total number of consultants firms used. We find that no significant 
change in annual compensation takes place when the total number of consultants used 
by a firm remains the same. We also find that when a firm adds an additional consultant 
(93 firm-years), the average (median) total compensation increases by 8.5% (4.4%). 
Both equity-based pay and variable pay show a significant increase too. On the other 
hand, when firms reduce the number of compensation consultants (82 firm-years), there 
is no statistically significant change in CEO compensation. 
 
We also make an analysis of CEO pay associated with the two leading compensation 
consultants (these have market share of 10% or more). Panel C of Table 3 reports the 
findings. The consultant firm New Bridge Street is solely used in case of 98 firm-years, 
whereas Towers Perrin is employed as the sole consultant in case of 54 firm-years. 
Comparing CEO pay data, we find that the mean (median) variable and total 
compensation is significantly larger when Towers Perrin is the only consultant of the 
firm rather than New Bridge Street. 
 
Regression analysis 
 
In this section, we discuss the results of multivariate regression analysis used to 
examine the two research questions of the study. Before we perform the regressions, we 
estimate the correlation coefficients among key variables. Overall, the estimated 
correlations are relatively small. We check for the possibility of serious 
multicollinearity problem and find that it is negligible (the variance inflations factors in 
the regression estimations are much less than 10). 
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Our first purpose is to examine if the level of annual compensation changes when firms 
employ multiple pay consultants. The natural logarithm of equity-based and total 
compensation of CEOs are used as the dependent variables. The main explanatory 
variable is the total number of compensation consultants used by a firm.11 We first run 
regressions using the natural logarithm of the total number of consultants and present 
the results in Table 4. As an alternate to this continuous variable, we use indicator 
variables that are equal to one for firms with two (three) or more consultants, and zero 
otherwise.12 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The results show that the use of multiple consultants is significantly related to equity-
based compensation. The regression coefficients of the variable representing the number 
of compensation consultants are positive and statistically significant for both pooled 
regression (column 1) and the random effects regression (column 2). The results 
indicate that equity-based compensation increases as the number of pay consultants 
increases. When we perform the analysis with total compensation, the results of which 
are presented in columns (3) and (4), we observe that although the estimated 
coefficients of the consultant variable are positive, these are statistically insignificant. In 
unreported regressions, we also examine variable compensation and find similar result. 
On the basis of these findings, we conclude that the practice of employing multiple 
consultants is associated with significantly higher equity-based compensation. The 
                                               
11 The use of proportions of variable pay and equity pay mix as the dependent variable does not materially 
change our results. Examining whether CEO compensation is lower for firms without consultants is not 
meaningful here because we identify only six firms that do not have a consultant. 
12 Because these results are not different from those presented in the paper, we do not report them. 
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finding suggests that firms decide to employ multiple consultants because different 
consultants specialize in different aspects of pay (Bender, 2008). 
 
The above relationship between CEO compensation and the total number of 
compensation consultants employed by a firm is examined using a variety of control 
variables representing firm, corporate governance and CEO characteristics. Many of 
these variables exhibit statistically significant effects in the expected direction. For 
example, we find that variables like stock return (a measure of firm performance) and 
firm size positively affect CEO pay. These are indeed a stylized fact in the executive 
compensation literature (Cadman et al., 2010; Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Brick et al., 
2006).13 We find that the coefficients of board size are significantly positive. The result 
suggests that firms with larger boards pay their CEOs more. The finding is consistent 
with the argument that a larger board is less effective and more susceptible to the 
influence of the CEO. We also observe that CEO duality has a significant influence on 
lowering executive compensation. This is not surprising because the incidence of CEO 
duality is common among founder-CEO managed firms in the UK. We find that the 
longer a CEO holds the position in a firm, the higher is the pay. The finding is 
consistent with the literature because CEO with a longer tenure is rewarded with higher 
pay for possessing more valuable human capital (Brick et al., 2006). 
 
The analysis above involves estimations with the total number of compensation 
consultants employed by a firm. We next perform an analysis to examine whether CEO 
compensation is related to change in the number of pay consultants. We therefore split 
the sample into three categories of firms representing increase, decrease and no change 
                                               
13 Sales are commonly adopted in studies to proxy for firm size (Conyon et al., 2009; Murphy and 
Sandino, 2010). There is no change in the results when total assets is used as another proxy for firm size. 
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in the number of pay consultants from one year to another. These different categories 
are estimated as individual dummy variables (dummy equals one if there in an increase, 
decrease, or no change in the number of consultants used, and zero otherwise). The 
estimated regression results are presented in Table 5. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
We observe that an increase in the number of consultants leads to an increase in both 
CEO equity-based compensation (columns 1 and 2) and total compensation (columns 3 
and 4). The estimated coefficients of the variable - increase in consultants - are positive 
and statistically significant. Interestingly, we also observe that when firms reduce the 
number of pay consultants, there is no corresponding reduction in CEO pay. In 
unreported regressions, we take the first differences of several explanatory variables and 
still obtain consistent findings. The results presented here complement the earlier 
findings reported in Table 4 showing that the use of multiple compensation consultants 
is associated with an increase in CEO pay.14 
 
We now proceed to address the second research question, namely the empirical relation 
between the market shares of compensation consultants and the client firm’s CEO pay. 
Table 6 reports the results.15 Pooled regression results examining equity-based 
                                               
14  In a robustness analysis, we examine if an increase or decrease in the number of pay consultants is 
related to percentage change in annual compensation. These results are quite similar, and therefore, are 
not presented separately. We also examine if an arriving pay consultant relates to an increase in CEO pay. 
Focusing on firms employing one consultant, we observe that only 40 firm-years experience a change in 
pay consultant. Although the estimated regression coefficients of the change in consultant variable are 
positive, these are statistically insignificant, perhaps due to the small number of observations. 
15 As mentioned earlier, the market share of compensation consultant is calculated using firms with only 
one consultant. This procedure, on the one hand, allows to clearly identify the share of each consultant; 
on the other hand, it leads to a reduction in the number of firm-year observations (311). The regressions 
reported here include the statistically significant control variables only. 
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compensation and total compensation are presented in columns (1) and (3). We observe 
that the regression coefficients of the market share variable are positive and statistically 
significant. To check the robustness of our results, we also employ random effects 
regressions and report the findings in columns (2) and (4). The core results remain 
unchanged. A statistically significant positive coefficient of market share is observed in 
case of equity-based compensation. 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
The results suggest that greater market share of compensation consultants is associated 
with higher client firm’s CEO pay. The rent extraction view indicates that pay 
consultants have a strong incentive to serve the interest of CEOs in order to retain their 
pay consulting business with client firms. The likelihood of losing business with the 
client firm is greater if the compensation consultant does not act in favor of the CEO. It 
is thus sensible for the consultant to advise towards higher CEO pay in order to 
maintain or even increase its market share. The argument is supported by Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003) who assert the following: “Providing advice that hurts the CEO’s 
pocketbook is hardly a way to enhance the consultant’s chances of being hired in the 
future by this firm or, indeed, by any other firms”. 
 
We perform an additional analysis whereby the effects of two leading compensation 
consultants are isolated.16 Dummy variables are used to identify each consultant. As 
before, firm, corporate governance and CEO-specific control variables are included. 
                                               
16 We restrict to two pay consultants because the market shares of other consultants are below 10% and 
these are used by a smaller number of firms.  
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The results are presented in Table 7. Columns (1) and (4) show results for New Bridge 
Street while columns (2) and (5) for Towers Perrin. We also estimate regressions using 
specifications that include both consultants jointly (columns 3 and 6). 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
The overall finding from Table 7 is that CEO compensation is significantly higher when 
the client firm receives advice from New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin. The 
estimated consultant dummy coefficients are positive with only two coefficients being 
statistically insignificant. If compensation consultants compete by way of advising 
towards greater pay for the client firm’s CEO, it is unsurprising to observe this tendency 
of leading consultants being associated with greater CEO pay.17 Anecdotal evidence 
also provides support to our finding: “…there is a clear link between companies with 
controversial remuneration practices and their pay consultants…A recent survey found 
that, together with its larger US rival Towers Perrin, New Bridge had effectively 
cornered the market...”18 
 
One may argue that larger firms that normally pay their CEOs more tend to employ 
compensation consultants with greater market share. We therefore examine the choice 
of the two leading compensation consultants (i.e. Towers Perrin and New Bridge Street) 
using logistic regression approach. The results show that firms paying their CEOs more 
tend to employ Towers Perrin and New Bridge Street, but there is no statistical support 
                                               
17 The model specifications used here implicitly assume that both New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin 
get employed by firms with similar firm characteristics. 
18 The Mail (February 6, 2005): ‘Get me an above-average pay consultant’. 
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for the conjecture that larger firms mostly receive recommendations from these two 
leading consultants. 
 
Additional sensitivity analysis 
 
The empirical findings presented so far on the association of CEO pay with 
compensation consultants and their market shares may be subject to the endogeneity 
problem. The number of compensation consultants can be an endogenous choice 
variable that most likely depends on factors like firm size, firm risk, remuneration 
committee members, etc. Similarly, the market share of compensation consultants and 
CEO pay can be simultaneously determined. The consequence is that the results 
reported so far can be subject to bias. Prior studies commonly use the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression method to tackle the endogeneity issue (e.g. Sun et al., 2009). 
Therefore, we perform a new analysis using the number of compensation consultants 
and their market share as endogenous variables and estimate the following two-equation 
system: 
jttj
n
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1 _..   (3) 
 
At first, we consider the number of compensation consultants as an endogenous choice 
variable and explain it by using factors like firm size, firm risk, size of the remuneration 
committee and CEO characteristics like age and tenure. The fitted values of the 
consultant variable are then used to explain CEO compensation. Two variables: the size 
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of the remuneration committee and firm risk are used as instrumental variables.19 The 
CEO compensation regression includes other control variables like stock return, board 
size and CEO duality. As before, we analyze both equity-based compensation and total 
compensation. 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 8 (columns 1 – 3). The first column 
explains the firm’s choice of number of consultants. The regression result shows that 
larger and more risky firms are the ones which employ multiple consultants. Firms with 
larger remuneration committees also seek advice from higher number of pay 
consultants. On the other hand, firms with higher institutional share ownership and 
higher tenure of CEOs tend to have lesser number of compensation consultants. 
Columns (2) and (3) present the second-stage results of equity and total compensation. 
We observe that the coefficient of compensation consultant variable is positive and 
statistically significant. While the pooled and random effects regressions presented in 
Table 4 (Panel A) show statistically significant results for equity-based compensation 
and insignificant results for total compensation, the 2SLS results presented here show 
that the multiple consultant variable is significantly related to both measures of CEO 
compensation. These new results reinforce our conclusion that CEO pay increases with 
an increase in the total number of compensation consultants used by firms. 
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
In the second part of the analysis, we examine if CEO compensation is related to market 
share of consultants. The first-stage regression considers market share as the 
                                               
19 The OLS results presented earlier in Tables 4-7 indicate that these two variables are not significantly 
related to CEO compensation. 
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endogenous variable; the predicted values are then used in the second-stage to explain 
CEO pay. The size of remuneration committee and firm risk are used as instrumental 
variables. Columns (4) to (6) of Table 8 exhibit the results. We find that market share is 
significant positively related to equity-based compensation and total compensation of 
CEOs. The 2SLS results are consistent with those obtained earlier (in Table 6) from 
pooled and random effects regressions. 
 
The positive relationship between CEO pay and the number of compensation 
consultants or their market shares could be driven by the firm's compensation contract 
itself. Firms with higher CEO pay contract may need to hire more compensation 
consultants and high reputation consultants (i.e., those with large market shares) for 
higher CEO pay justification. Therefore, we perform a robustness check by including 
lagged CEO pay in the first-stage regressions. Although the lagged analysis reduces the 
number of observations (and statistical significance), the main finding remains 
qualitatively similar. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
Compensation consultants are central to the CEO pay setting process but their role is 
currently understudied worldwide. Conyon et al. (2009) and Cadman et al. (2010) 
proclaim that little scientific evidence exists about the influence of compensation 
consultant on executive pay. Two opposing views on the role of compensation 
consultants are presented both in the media as well as in the academic literature (e.g. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Armstrong et al. 2008). On the one hand, compensation 
consultants are regarded as professional experts. They help firms to achieve optimal 
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contracting by offering a valuable service without which executive compensation can 
not be appropriately designed. On the other hand, the rent extraction or managerial 
power perspective asserts that compensation consultants do not act independent of the 
influence of firm’s executives. Consultants have strong incentives to advocate higher 
CEO compensation in order to enhance their chance of being hired in the future by the 
client firm for both pay and non-pay related services. Critics thus argue that by 
providing favorable advice, pay consultants are ratcheting up executive pay. 
 
Recent availability of data on compensation consultants has created a growing interest 
among academics to investigate the influence of compensation consultants on CEO pay 
(Murphy and Sandino, 2010). A few studies show that CEOs of firms that use 
compensation consultants receive higher pay relative to those who do not employ a 
consultant (Cadman et al., 2010; Conyon et al., 2009; Armstrong et al., 2008; Voulgaris 
et al., 2008). The interesting issue that has not yet been examined is whether CEO 
compensation further increases or even declines when firms adopt not just one but 
multiple compensation consultants. Conyon et al. (2009) report that most US firms use 
only one compensation consultant. Therefore, an original hand-collected dataset of UK 
firms for the period 2003-2006 is employed in this study. 
 
We find that almost all UK firms in our sample seek recommendations from 
compensation consultants, and the majority of the sample firms use multiple pay 
consultants. A bivariate analysis reveals that CEO pay increases as the number of pay 
consultants employed by the firm increases. Statistical analysis controlling for firm, 
CEO and corporate governance characteristics shows that the use of multiple 
compensation consultants is positively related to CEO equity-based pay. In addition, we 
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find that an increase in the number of consultants is associated with an increase in CEO 
pay, but there is no reduction in pay when the total number of pay consultants declines. 
The evidence lends support to the conjecture that firms employ multiple consultants to 
provide a justification of increased level of executive compensation. 
 
Critics argue that compensation consultants usually advise in favor of higher CEO pay 
in order to maintain their business interests with client firms and survive from intense 
competition. We examine this issue and observe that the market share of compensation 
consultants is positively related to CEO pay. This is particularly true for consultants 
with the two largest market shares (i.e. New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin). The 
finding is consistent with the argument that pay consultants act to survive competition 
from other consultants. Further analysis shows that firms that pay higher compensation 
to CEOs (but not necessarily larger firms) tend to choose consultants with the two 
largest market shares. 
 
Overall, the results of the study pose doubts on the claim that the use of compensation 
consultants in the executive pay setting process promotes optimal contracting. Rather 
the evidence is consistent with the managerial power view whereby the client firm’s 
CEO receives higher pay recommendations from compensation consultants. Our 
findings indicate a need to closely monitor the functioning of compensation consultants 
if shareholders’ interest is to be served. We suggest that future research examines the 
role of compensation consultants using data from other countries and explores in detail 
the institutional mechanisms that can be deployed to govern the practice of employing 
compensation consultants. Our finding that UK CEOs receive higher pay from 
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employing multiple pay consultants raises the question why CEOs of US firms do not 
use a similar practice. This is also an interesting issue for future research. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
 Variable Name Definitions  
CEO compensation  
Total compensation The sum of salary, bonus, benefit, defined-benefit pension 
increment, the value of restricted stock grant and stock option grant. 
Equity-based compensation The sum of the value of restricted stock grants and stock option 
grants. 
Variable compensation  The sum of bonus, pension increment, the values of restricted stock 
grants and stock option grants. 
  
Compensation consultants  
Consultants The natural logarithm of the number of compensation consultants. 
Market share The number of compensation consulting contracts a consulting firm 
has secured divided by the total number of compensation consulting 
contracts in the market. 
  
Firm characteristics  
Stock return The natural logarithm of annual change of a firm’s return index. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of sales. 
Firm risk  The standard deviation of annualised monthly stock return over 
prior 120-months.  
  
Governance characteristics   
Board size The natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. 
Non-executives The number of non-executive directors divided by the number of 
executive directors. 
RemCo  The natural logarithm of total number of remuneration committee 
members. 
Instit. own. The percentage of total institutional ownership that is greater than 
three per cent. 
CEO duality A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the 
Board, zero otherwise. 
  
CEO characteristics  
Age The natural logarithm of CEO age. 
Tenure The natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the 
position of CEO at the firm. 
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Table 1. Selection of sample companies 
 
The sample is made up of 175 non-financial UK firms during 2003-2006. Firms are 
classified into different industries using the UK Primary Standard Industrial 
Classification Codes collected from the Financial Analysis Made Easy database.  
 
Panel A. Sample selection 
 
Number of non-financial FTSE350 firms 251 
Firms with data unavailable, at least in one year, due to:  
 - takeover/delisted  (53) 
 - annual report not available  (16) 
 - compensation not disclosed (1) 
  181 
Firms without compensation consultant (6) 
Total number of sample firms  175  
 
Panel B. Industry classification 
 
Industry Number of firms Percentage 
 
Mining 
 
10 
 
6% 
Manufacturing 68 39% 
Construction 16 9% 
Wholesale and Retail 19 11% 
Transportation and Communication 20 11% 
Utilities 9 5% 
Other 33 19% 
Total 175 100%  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Firm-level statistics 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 175 non-financial UK firms during 
2003-2006 (700 firm-years). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
 Mean Median Min. Max. St. dev. 
Total compensation (£m) 1.94 1.40 0.15 22.79 1.85 
Equity-based compensation (£m) 0.73 0.37 0.00 20.37 1.31 
Variable compensation (£m) 1.36 0.89 0.00 21.93 1.69 
Stock return 0.14 0.17 -2.29 1.03 0.29 
Sales (£mil) 4,405 1,331 20 155,000 11,900 
Firm risk 0.33 0.32 0.01 0.94 0.12 
No. of compensation consultants 2 2 1 8 1 
No. of board members 10 10 5 21 2 
Non-executives/executives ratio 2 1 0 8 1 
No. of RemCo members 4 4 2 8 1 
Institutional ownership 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.74 0.14 
CEO age (years) 53 54 31 69 6 
CEO tenure (years) 6 4 1 34 6 
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Panel B: Compensation consultant statistics 
 
The table reports the frequency distribution of compensation consultants used by sample firms. 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
firm-
years 
% of 
total 
Number of consultants       
1 82 76 76 77 311 44.4 
2 50 53 49 51 203 29.0 
3 28 25 31 29 113 16.1 
4 11 13 17 12 53  7.6 
5 or more 4 8 2 6 20  2.9 
Total 175 175 175 175 700 100.0 
       
Name of the consultant       
New Bridge Street 55 64 60 68 247 17.9 
Towers Perrin 57 54 51 46 208 15.1 
Mercer 28 28 26 23 105 7.6 
Monks 30 26 19 20 95 6.9 
Deloitte 20 23 23 23 89 6.4 
Watson Wyatt 23 21 22 23 89 6.4 
Others 120 140 146 143 549 39.7 
Total 333 356 347 346 1382 100.0 
 
 32 
Table 3. Compensation consultants and CEO pay 
The table reports mean, median and standard deviation of CEO compensation. Panel A 
presents compensation for firms categorized according to the number of consultants used. 
Panel B presents percentage change in compensation. Panel C presents compensation for 
firms with the two largest consultants (with 10% or more market share). The sample 
consists of 175 non-financial UK firms during 2003-06. The asterisks ***, ** and * show 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
      Panel A: Number of consultants and CEO compensation (£000) 
 Salary  Equity-based 
compensation 
Variable 
Compensation 
Total 
Compensation 
One consultant (N = 311) 
Mean 488 544 1120 1658 
Median 440 313 751 1239 
St. dev. 190 796 1145 1314 
Two consultants (N = 203) 
Mean 521** 624 1199 1779 
Median 468** 396 879 1391 
St. dev. 207 959 1258 1461 
Three consultants (N = 113) 
Mean 538 985** 1675** 2274* 
Median 503 524** 999** 1583** 
St. dev. 182 2159 2421 2513 
Four consultants (N = 53) 
Mean 595* 1221 2026 2673 
Median 558 594 1454 2046 
St. dev. 252 1857 2552 2752 
More than four consultants (N = 20) 
Mean 741** 1811 3222 4071* 
Median 773** 1107 2563 3615** 
St. dev. 238 1868 2940 3020 
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  Panel B: Changes in the number of consultants and CEO compensation 
 Change in 
Salary  
Change in 
Equity-based 
Compensation 
Change in 
Variable 
Compensation 
Change in 
Total 
Compensation 
No change in the number of consultants used (N = 350) 
Mean 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.007 
Median 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.016 
St. dev. 0.012 0.123 0.135 0.152 
Increase in the number of consultants used (N = 93) 
Mean 0.005 0.065*** 0.075*** 0.085*** 
Median 0.005* 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.044*** 
St. dev. 0.009 0.304 0.310 0.320 
Decrease in the number of consultants used (N = 82) 
Mean 0.005 -0.009 -0.002 0.008 
Median 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.025 
St. dev. 0.008 0.344 0.344 0.346 
 
  Panel C: The two largest consultants and CEO compensation (£000) 
 
 Salary Equity-based 
compensation 
Variable 
Compensation 
Total 
Compensation 
New Bridge Street (N = 98) 
Mean 438 520 799 1499 
Median 412 349 592 1260 
St. dev. 146 706 867 1088 
Towers Perrin (N = 54) 
Mean 658*** 953 1435** 2733*** 
Median 646*** 757*** 1175** 2201*** 
St. dev. 260 1141 1436 1830 
 
 
 34 
 
Table 4. The number of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
The table presents the results for pooled and random effects regressions. The sample consists of 175 
non-financial firms during 2003-06 (700 firm-years). The dependent variables are CEO equity-based 
compensation and total compensation, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. The p-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
show statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
Equity-based compensation Total compensation 
Variable 
 
Pooled 
regression
(1) 
Random 
effects 
regression
(2) 
Pooled 
regression
(3) 
Random 
effects 
regression 
(4)  
Intercept -2.010* -1.363 2.531*** 2.693 *** 
 (0.071) (0.352) (0.000) (0.000)  
Consultants 0.303* 0.342* 0.051 0.043  
 (0.083) (0.072) (0.416 (0.538)  
Stock return 0.944*** 0.838*** 0.281*** 0.249 *** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  
Firm size 0.155* 0.178* 0.186*** 0.181 *** 
 (0.060) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000)  
Board size 2.331*** 1.870*** 0.801*** 0.776 *** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  
Non-executives -0.107 -0.131 0.072*** 0.029  
 (0.404) (0.0389) (0.005) (0.315)  
Institutional ownership -0.011 -0.005 -0.014*** -0.009 * 
 (0.048) (0.606) (0.001) (0.059)  
CEO duality -1.189*** -0.989** -0.494*** -0.451 *** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000)  
CEO tenure 0.15 0.279*** 0.093*** 0.098 *** 
 (0.115) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001)  
      
Adj. R2 0.11 0.14 0.31 0.44   
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Table 5. Changes in compensation consultants and CEO pay 
The table presents the results for pooled and random effects regressions. The sample consists of 175 
non-financial firms during 2003-06. Calculating year-to-year change in compensation consultant results 
in 525 firm-year observations. The dependent variables are CEO equity-based compensation and total 
compensation, expressed in the natural logarithm of their values. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The p-values are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Equity-based 
compensation 
  
Total 
compensation 
  
Variable 
 
 
Pooled 
regression 
(1) 
  
    Random 
    effects 
    regression 
     (2) 
  
Pooled 
regression 
(3) 
  
Random 
effects 
regression 
(4) 
  
Intercept -0.152 0.170 0.209 0.239 
 (0.540) (0.414) (0.408) (0.266) 
Increase in consultants 0.053* 0.058** 0.066** 0.069 *** 
 (0.104) (0.039) (0.053) (0.021) 
Decrease in consultants -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.741) (0.704) (0.960) (0.895) 
Lag compensation -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.110*** -0.109 *** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock return 0.085** 0.180** 0.112*** 0.102 ** 
 (0.036) (0.055) (0.014) (0.028) 
Firm size 0.019** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.025 *** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board size 0.047  0.047  0.073* 0.078 * 
 (0.223) (0.261) (0.076) (0.082) 
Non-executives -0.001  0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.973) (0.921) (0.802) (0.904) 
Institutional ownership -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.217) (0.088) (0.328) (0.229) 
CEO duality -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.084*** -0.089 *** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO tenure  0.001  0.001  0.003 0.003 
 (0.709) (0.731) (0.251) (0.265) 
     
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09  
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Table 6. Market share of compensation consultants and CEO pay 
 
The table presents the results for pooled and random effects regressions. The market share 
of a consultant is estimated by considering firms with only one consultant (311 firm-year 
observations). The sample period is 2003-06. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The p-values are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
  
Equity-based compensation Total compensation 
 
Variable 
Pooled 
regression 
 
(1) 
 
Random 
effects 
regression 
(2) 
 
    Pooled 
    regression 
 
    (3) 
 
        Random 
        effects 
        regression 
        (4) 
 
Intercept 4.766*** 4.670*** 6.945*** 6.987*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market share 0.216*** 0.139* 0.065*** 0.021 
 (0.001) (0.075) (0.000) (0.199) 
Non-executives 0.477** 0.432** 0.173*** 0.102* 
 (0.013) (0.034) (0.000) (0.051) 
Institutional ownership 0.032 0.004 0.003 -0.009** 
 (0.152) (0.804) (0.747) (0.039) 
CEO duality -1.413** -1.430** -0.249 -0.116 
 (0.019) (0.047) (0.181) 0.538 
       
Adj. R2 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.11 
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Table 7. The two largest compensation consultants and CEO pay 
The table presents the results for pooled regressions. The sample includes firms with only one consultant (311 
firm-year observations). The two largest consultants (New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin) are identified 
based on their market shares and expressed as dummy variables. The sample period is 2003-06. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. The p-values are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
Equity-based compensation 
 
Total compensation 
 
 
 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
       
Intercept -2.028 -1.172 -1.558 3.315 *** 3.669*** 3.592 *** 
 (0.248) (0.508) (0.376) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
New Bridge Street 0.545*  0.703** 0.048  0.141 * 
 (0.074)  (0.025) (0.514)  (0.052) 
Towers Perrin  0.575 0.808**  0.429*** 0.476 *** 
  (0.179) (0.069)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.101 0.062 0.072*** 0.119 *** 0.100*** 0.102 *** 
 (0.376) (0.594) (0.533) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board size 2.445*** 2.248 *** 2.194*** 0.857 *** 0.719*** 0.709 *** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-executives 0.376* 0.360 * 0.395** 0.109 *** 0.114*** 0.121 *** 
 (0.062) (0.078) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional ownership -0.011* -0.004 0.004 -0.013 * -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.603) (0.860) (0.867) (0.065) (0.379) (0.538) 
CEO duality -1.115* -1.179 -1.123** -0.263 * -0.279** -0.268 ** 
 (0.049) (0.037) (0.037) (0.088) (0.049) (0.049) 
CEO tenure -0.360*** -0.389 *** -0.345*** 0.084 *** 0.084*** 0.093 *** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
       
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.32 0.37 0.38 
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Table 8: 2SLS estimates of multiple consultants and consultant market share  
 
The table presents the results for the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. The OLS columns 
represent the results of the first stage regression. The sample period is 2003-06 (700 firm-year observations 
for Columns 1 - 3 and 311 firm-year observations for Columns 4 - 6). All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The p-values are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
Multiple compensation consultants 
  
Compensation consultant market share 
  
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  
Variable 
 
Multiple  
consultants
  
Equity-based 
pay  
  
Total pay
 
  
Consultant  
market share
  
Equity-based 
pay  
  
Total pay
 
  
 
(1) 
  
(2) 
  
(3) 
  
(4) 
  
(5) 
  
(6) 
  
Intercept -1.438*** -0.817 4.062*** -5.687 -0.602 2.252***
 (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) (0.168) (0.796) (0.000) 
Consultants  1.201** 0.546***    
  (0.032) (0.001)    
Market share     0.429* 0.113** 
     (0.065) (0.029) 
Stock return  1.119*** 0.334*** 0.338   
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.562)   
Firm size 0.092***    0.025 0.074** 
 (0.00)    (0.853) (0.021) 
Firm risk 0.993***   -3.542**   
 (0.000)   (0.012)   
Board size  2.384*** 1.239***  2.091*** 0.885***
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) 
RemCo size 0.286***   -0.556   
 (0.000)   (0.257)   
Non-executives     0.416** 0.118***
     (0.042) (0.000) 
Institutional ownership -0.015***   -0.117***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
CEO duality  -1.205*** -0.464*** -1.012*   
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.061)   
CEO tenure -0.032*   -0.240*   
 (0.092)   (0.078)   
CEO age 0.250   1.142   
 (0.116)   (0.277)   
       
Adj. R2 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.28  
 
